The thread on Iraqi federalism inspired a debate in the comments section about whether Iraq is facing a civil war or a religious war, or neither, or both.
Perhaps it’s just a question of semantics. We could (and no doubt will) quibble over each and every word in the alternate definitions: “civil,” “religious,” and “war.” But I think we can all agree that the sectarian, religious, and ethnic violence there is greater than desired, and that it’s difficult to see how it will end in the near future.*
So, how can we get perspective on what’s happening in Iraq right now? One thing that’s occurring represents a common phenomenon–as I wrote in this post on Russia and this one on North Korea–which is that, when dictatorships are removed, we face the spectre of chaos and dueling for position between rival factions now released from previous supression.
Dictatorships not only can make the trains run on time (although neither the USSR nor North Korea were/are famous for that), they put a firm lid of tyranny on the simmering tensions of ethnic and religious and other strife, and create an illusion of harmony. Then, when that lid is removed, the pot boils over. In addition–and especially if dictatorships are in power for a long time–they stir up the desire for revenge for old grievances perpetrated by the regime itself.
In Iraq, the pot is boiling, or at least simmering. The split seems to be along Sunni-Shiite lines, which indicates a religious war. But it’s not quite that simple (I’ll deal in greater depth with this question, and discuss religious wars in general, in Part II, tomorrow).
The Sunni-Shiite split occurred almost at the beginning of Islam, and Iraq is far from the only place it’s being played out. To simplify: Shiites dominate Iran, and Sunnis are more numerous in most Arab states (although not in Iraq, where Shiites constitute about two-thirds to the Sunni one-third). But the division is far from clear, and tribes, which also dominate the region, can be quite mixed, as Saudi Prince Turki has observed:
“…in most of Iraq the links and interlinks of Sunni and Shiites go far beyond the efforts to drive them apart,” Prince Turki said.
Many Iraqi tribes and clans contain both Sunnis and Shiites, and there are many Sunni-Shiite intermarriages, he noted, and the tribal and clan and personal links cross sectarian lines.
“In practical terms, how could such a civil war happen?” he asked. “It is practically impossible to divide Iraq into sectarian regions. It would mean mass emigration and ethnic cleansing, and a lot of killing between families and tribal groupings.
But that’s often true of areas where civil wars erupt. In fact, it’s one of the great tragedies of civil war itself. One has only to look at our own bloody Civil War, in which brother literally fought brother, and members of the same graduating class at West Point were generals on either side of the divide, to see how very possible it is.
To give one more example, the Tutsis and Hutus involved in the terrible genocide in Rwanda (mostly Hutus killing Tutsis, but moderate Hutus were also at risk) were commonly presented as sharply delineated ethnic groups. But in actuality this was far from the case:
Many researchers point out that both groups speak the same language, have a history of intermarriage and share many cultural characteristics. Traditionally, the differences between the two groups were occupational rather than ethnic…Tutsi can often be physically distinguished as taller than Hutu, but according to the vice president of the National Assembly Laurent Nkongoli, frequently “[y]ou can’t tell us apart, we can’t tell us apart.”
So one thing we can safely say is that the divisions in such wars are murky, and that family ties and long-term interactions don’t preclude the explosion of bitter and terrible violence.
Another thing we can say is that civil wars are exceedingly common, even though the majority of them receive far less publicity than the present conflict in Iraq. Take a look at this fascinating article by Monica Duffy Toft, associate professor of Pulic Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School.
Toft discusses whether the present conflict in Iraq qualifies as a civil war. Short answer: yes, it meets all the criteria, which are: (1) dispute over whom will govern; (2) [at least] two groups of organized combatants; (3) the state one of the combatants; (4) at least 1,000 battle deaths per year on average; (5) ratio of total deaths at least 95 percent to 5 percent for the two sides; (6) fought within the boundaries of an internationally recognized state.
But what’s most fascinating about Toft’s article–at least to me–is its conclusion, which is simply a list of all the civil wars that have darkened the world since 1940.
To save you the trouble of following the link, I hereby reproduce that list. You may get tired of scrolling down, but please bear with me:
Afghanistan I Civil War: Mujahideen, Taliban 1978 2001
Algeria I War of Independence 1954 1962
Algeria II Opposition to Bella 1963 1963
Algeria III Fundamentalists 1992 .
Angola I War of Independence 1961 1974
Angola IIa Angolan Civil War 1975 1994
Angola IIb UNITA Warfare 1998 2002
Argentina Coup 1955 1955
Azerbaijan/USSR Nagorno-Karabakh 1988 1994
Bangladesh Chittagong Hill 1972 1997
Bolivia I Popular Revolt 1946 1946
Bolivia II Bolivian Revolution 1952 1952
Brazzaville Ia Elections 1993 1993
Brazzaville Ib Factional Warfare 1997 1997
Burma I Communist Revolt 1948 1989
Burma II Karens 1948 .
Burma III Shan 1959 .
Burma IV Kachins 1960 1994
Burundi Ia Hutu Coup Attempt 1965 1965
Burundi Ib Hutu Rebellion 1972 1972
Burundi Ic Hutu/Tutsi 1988 1988
Burundi Id Hutu/Tutsi 1991 1991
Burundi Ie Hutu/Tutsi 1993 2003
Cambodia Ia Khmer Rouge 1970 1975
Cambodia Ib Viet Intervention 1978 1991
Cameroon War of Independence 1955 1960
Chad FROLINAT 1965 1997
Chile Army Revolt 1973 1973
China I Com Rev: Final Phase 1945 1949
China III Cultural Revolution 1966 1969
China IIa Tibet 1950 1951
China IIb Tibet 1954 1959
Colombia I La Violencia 1948 1958
Colombia II FARC 1964 .
Costa Rica Civil War 1948 1948
Cuba Cuban Revolution 1956 1959
Cyprus Ia Greek/Turk Clashes 1963 1964
Cyprus Ib Coup/Turk Invasion 1974 1974
Domin Republic Dominican Civil War 1965 1966
Egypt Free Officers’ Coup 1952 1952
El Salvador FMLN/FDR 1979 1992
Ethiopia I Eritrea 1961 1993
Ethiopia II Tigray 1975 1991
Ethiopia III Ogaden 1977 1978
Georgia I South Ossetia 1990 1992
Georgia II Abkhazia 1992 1993
Greece Greek Civil War 1944 1949
Guatemala I Coup 1954 1954
Guatemala II Guatemalan Civil War 1960 1996
GuineaBissau I War of Independence 1963 1974
GuineaBissau II Coup 1998 1999
India II Hyderabad 1948 1948
India III Naga Revolt 1956 1997
India IV Sikh Insurrection 1982 1993
India Ia Part/Kash/In-Pak War 1946 1949
India Ib Kashmir 1965 1965
India Ic Kashmir 1988 .
Indonesia I War of Independence 1945 1949
Indonesia III Acheh Revolt 1953 1959
Indonesia IV PRRI Revolt 1958 1961
Indonesia V PKI Coup Attempt 1965 1966
Indonesia VI East Timor 1975 1999
Iran I Kurds/Mahabad 1946 1946
Iran IIa Iranian Revolution 1978 1979
Iran IIb NCR/Mojahedin 1981 1982
Iraq I Army Revolt 1958 1958
Iraq II Mosul Revolt 1959 1959
Iraq IIIa Kurds 1961 1970
Iraq IIIb Kurds 1974 1975
Iraq IIIc Kurds 1980 1991
Iraq IV Shi’ite Insurrection 1991 1993
Israel/Palest Unrest/War of Indep 1945 1949
Jordan Palestinians 1970 1971
Kenya I Mau Mau 1952 1956
Korea Korean War 1950 1953
Laos Pathet Lao 1959 1973
Lebanon Ia First Civil War 1958 1958
Lebanon Ib Second Leb Civ War 1975 1990
Liberia NPFL 1989 1997
Madagascar MDRM/Independence 1947 1948
Malaysia Malayan Emergency 1948 1960
Moldova Trans-Dniester Slavs 1991 1997
Morocco I War of Independence 1952 1956
Morocco II Western Sahara 1975 1991
Mozambique I War of Independence 1964 1975
Mozambique II RENAMO 1976 1992
Namibia War of Independence 1966 1990
Nicaragua Rev/Contra Insurgen 1978 1990
Nigeria I Biafra 1967 1970
Nigeria II Maitatsine 1980 1984
Pakistan I Bangladesh 1971 1971
Pakistan II Baluchi Rebellion 1973 1977
Paraguay Coup Attempt 1947 1947
Peru Shining Path 1980 1999
Philippines I Huks 1946 1954
Philippines II NPA Insurgency 1969 .
Philippines IIIa Moro Rebellion 1972 1996
Philippines IIIb Moro Rebellion 2000 .
Romania Romanian Revolution 1989 1989
Russia Ia First Chechen War 1994 1996
Russia Ib Second Chechen War 1999 .
Rwanda Ia First Tutsi Invasion 1963 1964
Rwanda Ib Tutsi Invasion/Genoc 1990 1994
Sierra Leone RUF 1991 2002
Somalia Clan Warfare 1988 .
South Africa Bl/Whit, Bl/Bl 1983 1994
South Korea Yosu Sunch’on Revolt 1948 1948
Sri Lanka II Tamil Insurgency 1983 .
Sri Lanka Ia JVP I 1971 1971
Sri Lanka Ib JVP II 1987 1989
Sudan Ia Anya Nya 1955 1972
Sudan Ib SPLM 1983 2005
Syria Sunni v. Alawites 1979 1982
Tajikistan Tajik Civil War 1992 1997
Tunisia War of Independence 1952 1956
Turkey Kurds 1984 .
USSR I Ukraine 1942 1950
USSR II Lithuania 1944 1952
Uganda I Buganda 1966 1966
Uganda II War in the Bush 1980 1986
Vietnam I French-Indochina War 1946 1954
Vietnam II Vietnam War 1957 1975
Yemen Southern Revolt 1994 1994
Yemen North I Coup 1948 1948
Yemen North II N. Yemeni Civil War 1962 1970
Yemen South S. Yemeni Civil War 1986 1986
Yugoslavia I Croatian Secession 1991 1995
Yugoslavia II Bosnian Civil War 1992 1995
Yugoslavia III Kosovo 1998 1999
Zaire/Congo I Katanga/Stanleyville 1960 1965
Zaire/Congo II Post-Mobutu 1996 .
Zimbabwe Front for Lib of Zim 1972 1979
You probably have noted quite a few things. First, the list is incredibly long. Second, these are virtually all third-world countries. Third, many of them have had not just one, but a long series of civil wars. Fourth, Iraq has had six previous civil wars since 1940.
The present one would be the seventh. And yes, it’s happening on our watch. But the forces that are represented there are the forces that have been long brewing in Iraq. Similar forces are brewing in many unsettled third-world countries (and sometimes it seems that most third-world countries are unsettled).
In addition, some of these civil wars on the list are also proxy international wars, in which foreign powers ally with one segment or other to try to influence matters to the benefit of that foreign power. There’s an argument to be made that the present war in Iraq is at least partly just such a proxy war between the US and Iran, just as the Vietnamese war represented (as did so many civil wars of that era) a struggle between Communism and the US.
[Tomorrow, Part II: religious wars]
*[Another thing we can quibble about is whether the present violence in Iraq should have been foreseen, and what (if anything) could have been done to nip it in the bud. I’ve put this question in a footnate to try to avoid derailing the thread into an argument about these old and oft-debated questions. For myself, I think the shortness and ease of the original, official war was clearly illusory; I fully expected a longer-drawn-out war at the beginning, with violence of the street-to-street variety. And, for the record, I think many errors of judgment were made (and continue to be made) in terms of clamping down more harshly on elements such as Sadr, back when he was first consolidating power; the perception of impending anarchy gripped the nation from the first postwar days. And yet I’ve never seen alternatives (more troops, etc., or even leaving Saddam in power) as simple solutions–they create their own, alternative, problems.]
Previously a lifelong Democrat, born in New York and living in New England, surrounded by liberals on all sides, I've found myself slowly but surely
December 31st, 1969 at 5:00 pm
The Rumsfield doctrine of swift, light, and well-armed is excellent for the first phase, defeating the armies, but not the second phase, rebuilding.
Rumsfield wanted about 60,000 troops. He didn’t get it. Afghanistan was light, it wasn’t swift. When you have light troops, wars take longer but in the end they well, end. The faster the march to Baghdad was, the longer the occupation would be. That is why Rumsfield wanted like 50,000 troops, and either he was overruled by Bush or Rumsfield compromised with Shinseki to get more. So that neither Shinseki got what he wanted nor Rumsfield.
You know Sergey, I thought that’s what you were getting at in the last discussion, but just couldn’t bring myself to believe it.
everywhere that you go Unk, you will always encounter classical liberals interested in doing whatever it takes to restore human rights and dignity to the whole of humanity, regardless of what it requires, Empire or no Empire.
Damned if I know.
Which about sums up the Spank position. He knows everything that went wrong, but even with that hindsight, he still doesn’t know what to do now. It’s like that old joke about people doing the same things, and expecting different results.
October 18th, 2006 at 9:27 pm
However conservative or Republican one may be, I think we can agree that it is astronomically unlikely that George W Bush knew when he invaded that there were 7 previous civil wars in Iraq since WW II.
That is a real problem. Different from neo’s original subject, but nevertheless a real problem.
I confess, however, I don’t know what difference it would have made had he known. Perhaps there would have been a much better chance at avoiding screwups.
October 18th, 2006 at 11:39 pm
No I don’t agree with you Warren.
The implication is that unsettled third world countries are doomed to eternal civil war and I don’t agree nor does the Bush Doctrine. Third world countries are now just gaining mass communication access to the modern world, up until March 2003 Iraqis risked their lives to hide satellite dishes on their roof tops just to get a glimpse of freedom.
Yet when Iraqis are liberated to join the modern world what are they greeted with; anti-war illiberal Leftist moonbats who pound away on the tv screen, in newspapers, books, films, music, and every other liberal luxury available to tell Iraqis how their lives and our lives weren’t worth the effort simply because moonbats hate Bush.
In other words you believe in nothing, just leave it at that.
And if I were to believe unsettled third world countrues are doomed to civil war then what point is there to Liberalism’s monumental icon the infamous United Nations?
October 19th, 2006 at 12:42 am
However conservative or Republican one may be, I think we can agree that it is astronomically unlikely that George W Bush knew when he invaded that there were 7 previous civil wars in Iraq since WW II.
Typical attack on BushÂ’s intelligence. Bush got better grades than Kerry at Yale yet Bush is always the ignoramus and Kerry is an intellectual. The lack of glib speaking skills and the Texas accent is just too much for the small-minded to overcome.
October 19th, 2006 at 2:19 am
Hmmm, Civil war?
“it meets all the criteria, which are: … (2) [at least] two groups of organized combatants; (3) the state one of the combatants;”
It seems to me to fail on these two counts- for (2), who are the clearly defined (”organized”) two groups of combatants? You just got through explaining to us how it isn’t clear at all. For (3), is the state one of the combatants? People generally talk about a Sunni-Shia civil war, but the government is neither, so how does that pan out. I don’t believe it is a civil war in proper definition. It’s chaotic, violent, there are sparring groups, but I think, despite the death tolls, it’s still not a civil war (no matter how much some may wish to see it as such).
I’ll also throw in that most people don’t seem to understand that Shi’i in Iraq and the Iranian Shia are not monolithic, and in fact, probably mostly dislike each other as one side is Arab and the other Persian. It is indeed complicated, but that may in the end serve as a detriment to forming a civil war, as it would make it more difficult to form clear ’sides’ in a conflict.
October 19th, 2006 at 2:25 am
“Perhaps there would have been a much better chance at avoiding screwups.”
-Warren
That’s your problem Warren- you deludedly believe wars can be fought perfectly, with no screw-ups if only the ‘right people’ were in charge instead of Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld. Grow up, wars have never been fought ‘perfectly’ or without ’screw-ups’, they’re generally a succession of screw-ups punctuated by victories (for the winner). It’s all about adaptation and implementation of new tactics and strategies. If you’ve got any bright ideas as to how things should be done, let us know, otherwise, your complaints that there have been screw-ups reeks of partisan defeatism.
October 19th, 2006 at 4:09 am
So one thing we can safely say is that the divisions in such wars are murky, and that family ties and long-term interactions don’t preclude the explosion of bitter and terrible violence.
But you can use such ties to restrain the war before it goes hot. A lot of Southerners thought the North was bluffing, so they thought that a few skirmishes and everything would be okay. This “illusion” perpetrated during war, due to the fog of war, pulls people down into this pit that they can only get out of with victory or death.
If you could have convinced either side that they were going to LOSe, and lose big or lose more than they would gain, then the civil war would not occur regardless of whatever tensions are going on.
The US has the power, but not the will, to present a convincing case to both Shia and Sunnis that NEITHER will win if they start fighting. A convincing case would be a simple declaration that both sides will be considered by the US as enemies of Iraq, and purged if such a war goes hot. Thereby giving both factions a couple of reasons not to fight each other.
The more Rumsfield talks about “oh, we’re just going to stand back and let them fight it out”, the more the Al Sadr, Iran Badr Brigades, and Sunni terrorists think that “hey, if we ramp up the sectarian murders, we might get the US out of our way so we can FINALLY take the fight to those no good X, and Ys”.
The best way to get more death, is to act like more violence will reward the separate power factions in Iraq.
In addition, some of these civil wars on the list are also proxy international wars, in which foreign powers ally with one segment or other to try to influence matters to the benefit of that foreign power.
Most of the revolutions and guerrila wars in history were engineered and funded by foreign powers intent on getting a slice of the pie.
A bunch of peasants didn’t just suddenly start totting military hardware they dug from a mine.
*[Another thing we can quibble about is whether the present violence in Iraq should have been foreseen, and what (if anything) could have been done to nip it in the bud.
We can nip it in the bud right not by getting rid of all those guys in Iraq seeking to carve a piece of territory using intimidation and cruelty. Trying to have a successful revolution without getting rid of the domestic insurgencies, is like the US trying to have a workable government after the Revolutionary War while keeping all those British loyalists in New England instead of shipping them back to England and over to Canada. Not going to work, if you have a bunch of enemies inside your country after a civil war.
in terms of clamping down more harshly on elements such as Sadr, back when he was first consolidating power; the perception of impending anarchy gripped the nation from the first postwar days.
Like I say, since you can’t change the past, NONE of that matters. What matters is what they are
October 19th, 2006 at 4:11 am
Like I say, since you can’t change the past, NONE of that matters. What matters is what they are doing, or NOT doing, right now. And that, is really the problem.
It seems to me to fail on these two counts- for (2), who are the clearly defined (”organized”) two groups of combatants?
Sistani vs Al Sadr vs Badr Iran Brigades vs Sunni Al Qaeda vs Sunni Baathists, to name a few in the free for all. And it is a free for all.
You just got through explaining to us how it isn’t clear at all.
That is just Neo’s style.
People generally talk about a Sunni-Shia civil war, but the government is neither, so how does that pan out.
The Shia Revival, pans it out pretty well, douglas.
October 19th, 2006 at 6:33 am
“Cry Havoc! and let slip the dogs of war.”
-Willie Shakespeare
Some things never change…
October 19th, 2006 at 6:36 am
Your final addendum says a lot, neo. You aren’t interested in taking out some of the Times/WaPo people? whose thinking, or lack of, is pitiful!!
I wonder if Warren could figure as much, without the MSM filling his brain.
October 19th, 2006 at 6:49 am
Our biggest mistake was to trust the shi’ite and Sistani. The Shi’ites don’t care about Iraq only their caliphate and the ummah…Most Iraqi shi’ites are Iranian descent and have no loyalty to Iraq as a nation.
October 19th, 2006 at 1:17 pm
Liberals must really grimace when they see such a long, long list. Talk about a harsh kick to the crotch! They must get a painful, sinking feeling in their guts when they realize they can’t blame every one of those conflicts on Bush. They rush off in a panic to hug and pet whales and empower those in need with fine words and promises of entitlements. What else can they do? Talk about an expanded list of victims and giving a fresh breath of air to the villification of corporate America. Oil lust! Greed! Profit mongering! War mongering! Racism! Oppression! Cultural destruction! Rape! Abuse! Slavery!
October 19th, 2006 at 5:22 pm
This long list of so-called “civil wars” is really list of failed states. And one should first of all understand what makes a state failure. Statehood is not something natural, that can be accepted as matter-of-course; a long path of historical development leads to ability to create a functional state. And we must honestly realize that only small fraction of peoples inhabiting the Earth have now achived this level of advancement. All others, really majority of them, can not create and sustain functional states. This problem historically was solved by empires - Roman, Persian, Russian, British. The only alternative to it is never ending intertribal wars. That is why decolonization was a nightmare to absolute majority of “liberated” nations: the list cited by Neo is the best proof to this. What can be an ultimate solution? A re-colonization, of course. And since all previous major players in this field have droped out of a race, US alone can and ought to do this work. It has no choice in it: every failed and not policed state will, like Afganistan, turned to be a training ground and safe haven for anti-american jihad.
October 19th, 2006 at 5:57 pm
I sincerely believe a major mistake was made once occupation, as opposed toi liberation, began: there were simply not enough troops on the ground. The Rumsfield doctrine of swift, light, and well-armed is excellent for the first phase, defeating the armies, but not the second phase, rebuilding.
October 19th, 2006 at 6:04 pm
You know Sergey, I thought that’s what you were getting at in the last discussion, but just couldn’t bring myself to believe it.
The US has no choice but to “Re-colonize” the world?
I found a report about a study on the causes of civil wars which I found interesting. The authors state:
“The factors that explain which countries have been at risk for civil war are not their ethnic or religious characteristics but rather the conditions that favor insurgency.”
These include:
Extreme poverty — countries with a gross domestic product of less than $6,500 per person;
Political instability in new or failing states;
Rough terrain enabling rebels to hide easily;
Large populations;
External financing.”
Also Neo, it’s posts like these that make me wonder if you have ever considered using one of those “read the rest of this article” tricks. If so, here is a simple way to do it…
October 19th, 2006 at 6:14 pm
Sergey–part of my research for this post included the subject of nationalism and statehood, and how difficult it is to achieve. Perhaps another post for another time.
October 19th, 2006 at 6:47 pm
See Mohammad Ayoob on civil wars occuring in states with weak institutions. The weaker the government, the more likely it is another group will challenge the state’s monopoly over power; the weaker the state, the more likely it is to use coercive violence than other means of coercion.
The good historical analogy is European state formation in the 16th-18th or so centuries. Lots of civil wars as various factions vied to see who would run the place. The Third World recreates these conditions pretty well. Want to stop civil wars from happening? Promote institutional development in the Third World.
See Fearon and Laitin on insurgency. Civil wars correlate not to ethnic diversity or grievances, but rather to the presence of conditions that are conducive to insurgency: foreign sponsors, mountainous terrain, etc.
Again: if you want to prevent civil wars, reduce the factors that contribute to insurgency (and, with Ayoob, weaken state power). Fearon and Laitin say: an insurgency can be maintained by ~2000 or less men at arms. If economic conditions are bad enough that you have 2000 young men who find insurgency a valid alternative to poverty, you need to find a way of bettering economic conditions, and so on.
So what is the lesson we can learn about Iraq from this? If the civil war occured because of weak state institutions and conditions that make insurgency easy, then we screwed up pretty thoroughly on this one. We eliminated the Iraqi state, almost completely, and replaced it with…well, nothing for months. No army, no police, no security, no border guards, no water or power, nothing. So we had looting, and we have supplied flowing over the border to insurgents, and we have poor Iraqis who take jobs as spotters and bombers, and so forth.
By creating these conditions in the first place, the US made insurgency easy and allowed for various factions (not Kurdish/Arab, or Shi’ite/Sunni, because as Fearon and Laitin found, divisions like these are statistically irrelevant to civil war) to vie for power with a weak state.
The solution is: reduce the conditions that make insurgency easy, and build strong state institutions. But how do you build state institutions when insurgents blow up the buildings and assassinate the officials? How do you improve economic conditions when workers refuse to go to work out of fear for their lives? How do you stop foreign support if you don’t have enough troops to patrol all the borders? Damned if I know. But speaking as a crazed, America-hating liberal, I can say, based on evidence provided by actual scholars who did actual studies with actual numbers and actual facts, that we really messed up in Iraq. We made some serious strategic blunders, and we’re paying for them now. And no one, I think, has any idea what to do about it.
October 19th, 2006 at 6:57 pm
Many interesting points. So why isn’t the UN concerned with ‘failed states?’ (Or ARE FAILED states, along with terrorist states, a MAJOR part of the the UN?)
American Thinker (in a subject tangent to this thread) quotes the most astounding statement from Hans Blix concerning nuclear proliferation, including:
‘”There is an unease by the non-nuclear states that they are being cheated by the nuclear states,” added Blix.’
He must be insane.
http://americanthinker.com/comments.php?comments_id=6386
–one other excerpt from the statement–
(Note how Blix lies): “Both the problems of Libya and Iraq have been solved.”
(truth: NOT BY THE UN, or the NPT, but by the ‘arrogant’ US and Bush.)
October 19th, 2006 at 7:01 pm
Even worse than all that is: if you want to prevent a civil war from dragging out, or another one starting in the future after this one ended, it’s important to stop the fighting as soon as possible.
Ethnic wars don’t really exist; see John Mueller, “The Banality of Ethnic War.” What did Clausewitz say? War is an extension of politics by other means. Why do we always forget this? I’m not so sure. But: we don’t need to rely on a fantasy of some Hobbesian “war of all against all,” and we don’t need to rely on the idea of ancient tribal enmities suddenly exploding in an orgy of primitive violence to explain intrastate conflict.
Neo pointed out that in Rwanda, there were no real differences between the Hutus and the Tutsis. These are not “ethnicities.” The division between the two originated in the Rwandan kingdom as an economic concept; if you owned more than four or ten or whatever cows, you were a Tutsi. In the parts of modern Rwanda not controlled by the historical kingdom, there was no genocide, because there were no Hutus and Tutsis, just Rwandans.
So if we listen to Clausewitz, what’s the answer? That often times small groups, Hutu Power in Rwanda or Milosevic’s regime in Belgrade, will start a war between their group and some small powerless minority as a way of mobilizing their people, and of cementing their control over that dominant group. They tell their people: “that weak group is really a murderous horde of barbarians who want to rape your women and kill you and steal your goats. So go fight them!”
The result is: an “ethnic war” between ethnic groups that didn’t really exist before and didn’t really have any meaning before the fight. But the longer the war goes on, the more attrocities and revenge piles up, the more complicit the population becomes in murder, the more the situation comes to resemble the fiction of ethnic war.
In Bosnia, no one used to vote for parties along ethnic/sectarian lines. Now everyone does. The longer the war drags on, the more average Sunnis and average Shi’ites, who used to get along without too much trouble, will think of themselves only as Sunnis with Shi’ite enemies or Shi’ites with Sunni enemies, and then piecing Iraq back together gets that much harder. Every day that goes by makes it more likely that the war will continue or that it will start again later.
October 19th, 2006 at 7:07 pm
“There is an unease by the non-nuclear states that they are being cheated by the nuclear states,” added Blix.”
Why shouldn’t there be? Why, if you are a state with legitimate security concerns but without the means of dealing with them at a conventional level, wouldn’t you consider nuclear weapons as an alternative?
The problem with the Bush administration’s approach to a nonproliferation framework is that it is perceived as being fundamentally unfair. We have less of a problem with Indian and Israeli nukes than with Pakistani or Iranian nukes because we trust the Iraelis and Indians; they’re our allies and they’re democracies. Right?
But if you want to establish a nonproliferation regime to which states will voluntarily adhere (and, face it, we don’t have a way of forcing mandatory adherence around the world), it has to be fair. That is, the rules have to apply equally to everyone. We might think that it makes total sense for us to say “Iran, you can’t have nukes; India, you can.” It makes sense from our strategic perspective, no? But it doesn’t from an Iranian, or a Pakistani, or a Saudi, or an Egyptian perspective. Who would want to join an international framework, the only rule of which is “the US makes the rules”? Would the US join an international framework in which another country decided which countries should have nuclear weapons based on some arbitrary criteria - that country X is an ally, country Y is an enemy, country Z is more trustworthy - ? Why should we?
If we want countries to voluntarily adhere to nonproliferation, it has to be based on a set of fair, non-arbitrary rules.
October 19th, 2006 at 8:40 pm
I disagree, Spanky, but yours is an attractive argument. Your statement about ‘Legitimate security concerns’ smacks a bit of Soviet style cant, and might easily apply to any wannabe dictator looking for prey.
All said and done, I don’t believe in fairness.
I’m not voting for Ted Turner’s world: his recent statement that if we can have hundreds of nuclear weapons– Iran should have a few, too!
I want good countries running the world. And, yes, the definition of a good country has to fit my idea (or America’s idea) of what a good country is. IT’S our idea of good. Someone has to be boss. (Has it not always been that way?)
If we give power to our internal isolationist forces (mostly Democratic), we will choose an international world where China; Chavez; or Iran is boss.
Maybe ‘fair,’ but worth opposing under any circumstances.
October 19th, 2006 at 9:25 pm
But jgr, it’s not about being fair for the sake of fairness. Let’s step back for a moment and say: “who cares about fairness for the sake of fairness? Not us.”
Ok. So we want good countries running the world, and bad countries to not have nuclear weapons. I also want mountains of ice cream and puppies raining from the sky. How do I propose to achieve this? That is, what means do I have at my disposal and am willing to use to achieve my goals?
“Someone has to be boss.”
The problem is that, despite our massive wealth and power, we’re still not all-powerful. We have finite resources. We do not have the means of simply deciding that Iran and North Korea and all other bad guys will not have nuclear weapons and having it be so. We must devise a policy, based on our resources, to achieve this goal.
So we try to establish a framework within which states will voluntarily agree not to have nuclear weapons. We can’t invade them, we can’t buy them off, we can’t do a whole lot of things, so we say: let’s all agree. We say: you can have nukes, and you can have nukes, but you, the guy in between? You can’t have nukes.
Why would the guy in between ever agree to this, voluntarily? Iran has Israel in the west with nukes, US forces in Iraq, US forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India to the east with nukes, Russia and China to the northish with nukes, etc etc etc. Why would Iran ever agree to voluntarily foreswear nuclear weapons if all of its neighbors are “allowed” by the “boss” to have nukes?
We’re not the boss, and we don’t set the rules. We’d like to be, but we’re simply not strong enough to dictate to these countries. We must get them to cooperate. In which situation is a state, any state, a generic state, more likely to cooperate: under a regime of objective, standard rules, or a regime in which one country, which you don’t like much and which has talked about invading you and which has troops on your borders makes the rules?
If we’re serious about coercing Iran to cooperate, it doesn’t make a whole lot of sense to tell Iran: “give up nukes or else!” if we don’t have an “or else!” That’s like threatening to hold our breath until we pass out if Iran doesn’t give up its nuclear program.
October 19th, 2006 at 11:02 pm
Spanky, stop making so much SENSE, ya big MOONBAT! We wanna nuke somebody and you’re spoiling the party.
October 19th, 2006 at 11:14 pm
Spanky> Are you implying, then, that it is impossible to prevent Iran from getting nukes?
October 19th, 2006 at 11:51 pm
Justin, what I tried to get across was that it is impossible to simply wave your hand and have Iran not have nuclear weapons.
No matter how badly we would like to do so, we have to seek ways that are in accordance with the situation in Iran and with our resources. We cannot simply say to Iran “don’t have nukes!” unless we have the means to coerce them to give up their program.
So when Blix says that non-nuclear states feel cheated by the nuclear nonproliferation regime, we shouldn’t just say “haha, that crazy Hans Blix!” and totally disregard his warning. It’s not just some rediculous blah blah blah about fairness. He’s saying something about the nature of cooperation in the international system in which no state, not even the US, is so powerful that it can compel compliance. If we want Iran, et al, to voluntarily agree to give up their nuclear programs, it doesn’t suffice to tell them “no,” and it doesn’t do much good to establish a system in which one country, us, decides the rules based on our interests. Should the US, for example, voluntarily give up its nuclear arsenal if, say, China decided that the US can’t be trusted while Iran could be? No, it shouldn’t and wouldn’t. Would Iran give up its nukes if we say Iran can’t be trusted but India can? No, it wouldn’t. But would a country give up its nukes if it followed objective, fair, commonly-agree upon rules? That’s a little more likely. Not guaranteed, but more likely.
October 20th, 2006 at 12:14 am
Spanky, you write well. It’s a subject I’ve not explored fully. As a child of the Cold War period, nukes scare me. I always hope they will. I’m not sure your thinking sees this.
I believe that George Bush’s work has temporarily stopped nuclear attacks on world wide civilian targets, whether by terrorists or terrorist states. There is a US threat in today’s world; we both know it. Some of N. Korea’s belligerence could stem from that US threat.
You mix too much politics in something that, for me, is too dangerous to play politics with. The idea that Iran would lie down with Israel if they BOTH have nukes.. or that any situation would be improved by some sort of unenforceable possession of MAD.. sorry, I can’t grasp that.
Take Hugo! (as one example) he could easily destabilize the entire hemisphere.
We are such a fragile world in contrast to the past, mainly because of media and trade. The lines of commerce lie unguarded, whether Chinese, ME oil, Japanese exports.. interdependence has meant more vulnerability. And much of the world will not seriously face the ruin promised by nuclear ambitions. I feel you aren’t.
As I say, it’s not my field. But your rationality is too appealing.
October 20th, 2006 at 12:37 am
Well, I have to admit that it’s reassuring that you find rationality appealing. But I wasn’t suggesting that the ideal situation is one in which Iran and Israel both have nuclear weapons - rather I tend to think that the ideal situation is one in which no one has nukes (well, maybe keep a couple in case of eschatological alien invasion/approaching comet of doom situation).
But more important to this conversation is: Iran is unlikely to cooperate in an international framework in which it is not allowed to have nukes, its neighbors are allowed to have nukes, and the agent making that decision is the US. Iran is unlikely to cooperate so long as the framework isn’t “mutual cooperation and disarmament,” but rather, “do as we say to suit our interests.”
I’m not sure how that’s political.
October 20th, 2006 at 12:39 am
To wake up the liberals from their slumber, I propose a simulation software to be build by Ratytheon or Lockhead in which sharia laws and theocracy are enforced by the club weilding civilian-clothed (preferably in black) paramilitary and the moral police. This software should also include, hangnig via booming crane industry in town squares, extra-judicial killings, suicide bombing algorhythm, raping of virgins before they are executed, killing gays, tortures such as cutting the tongue of the head of the Worker’s Union, removing the eyes of your dissidents gingerly, stoning (use only standardized size) ,dihmmitude, and so on.
October 20th, 2006 at 12:51 am
Wow, Red, you mean that’s what it would be like to live under a theocratic totalitarian regime???? I must get on the phone with my comrades at Berkley and let them know! We had no idea! We must inform liberal voters before our plan of having them vote for liberal candidates is carried out! To the Commie Cave!
October 20th, 2006 at 12:54 am
Oh, I forgot. The software should also allow for mass slaughter of all commies to the tune of 30,000 within a one month period.
October 20th, 2006 at 1:07 am
There are 30,000 extant commies? Huh. My Commie Rolodex, compiled by my comrades in San Fransisco, only lists 25, and it’s supposed to be comprehensive. Red, could you get me in touch with some of these guys?
October 20th, 2006 at 1:20 am
Dhimmiecrat: The software simulates Iranian theocracy and what’s been happening inside Iran since 1979. I’m not sure what you’re talking about.
October 20th, 2006 at 1:29 am
Red - while Iran is an oppressive oligarchical state with lots of really nasty stuff going on, the situation isn’t nearly as bad as the nightmare world you’re describing.
But beyond that - what’s the relevance? “Iran is a terrible dictatorship. This is why we should make loud noises to them about not having nuclear weapons that we can’t back up.” Is that what you’re trying to say? The nature of the Iranian regime is irrelevant to discussions about complellence or coercion in voluntary international nonproliferation regime. Unless we have some other means I am unaware of, we can’t just wave our hands and force Iran to comply. So we have these neat little things, these regimes, and Hans Blix said: the regime only works, countries will only choose to cooperate, if they think that it’s fair; that is, they’re not going to enter it to benefit the interests of some other country (especially the US) to no gain and some loss to them.
Does that make sense? A country will only cooperate if it thinks it’s worthwhile to cooperate, and if the nature of cooperation is “do everything the US wants, give up an asset, and gain nothing,” then why would Iran, or any country, want to cooperate?
October 20th, 2006 at 1:50 am
while Iran is an oppressive oligarchical state with lots of really nasty stuff going on, the situation isn’t nearly as bad as the nightmare world you’re describing.
When was the last time you lived there? How do you know it’s not so bad? Do you have nieces and nephews living there who are brutalized physically (my nephew was brutally beatn by the Basijis and almost lost his beautiful blue eyes) socially, economically, politically, on a daily basis because they are not part of the ruling elite? Well, I do.
Fourty percent of Iranians live below poverty line while Khamenie et al are investing their billions in Dubai and Canada. Iran has the highest rate of addicts in the world. One out of 16 are addicts, trafficking woman is an state-run venture by the IRGC, Iran has executed 10.10 people per day so far this year….
BTW, The liberals are not helping the Iranian people by minimizing,covering up and trivilizing the mullah’s atrocities and perhaps you’re contributing to an eventual nuking of Iran. Highlighting the truth about Iran will probably make military/sanctions even less necessary, if it is possible that the Iranian regime will collapse on its own.
I’m too upset to continue this now. Maybe later.
October 20th, 2006 at 1:59 am
ﺴﺭﺥ
Look, the Iranian regime is awful and trust me, it would be wonderful, wonderful, if the Iranian people could finally rid themselves of it and have the democracy they deserve. And you’re right - publicizing a regime’s crimes can have an impact. Look what we did to apartheid in South Africa. I’m certainly not sure how liberals are covering up the Iranian regime’s crimes.
But! But, and this is the only but - in a discussion of international nonproliferation regimes, the nature of the government of a state matters much less than the nature of the regime and the coercive power of the members of the regime. That’s all.
October 20th, 2006 at 3:49 am
Hahaha! You always know Serious Thinking is going on when Yammer is around!
At least I admit that the situation is so bad that it’s beyond me to pretend to know how to solve; at least I know that there’s little point in blathering on about problems I don’t understand and imaginary solutions based on uneducated fantasies.
October 20th, 2006 at 11:15 am
All those considerations about fairness, cooperation, providing incentives apply only to sane people and sane states. But NK and Iran leadership are not sane, they are megalomaniacs, apocalyptic psychopaths, so to seek some negotiable settlement with them is madness too. With such guys even MAD does not work. How anybody can cooperate with suicide bomber? This is exactly why US does not object Pakistan or India or Israel to have nukes, but denies this “right” to NK and Iran. With the first group of states it is possible to negotiate, and this is successfully done. And with the second all these attempts, made by Clinton and his administration, turn to be failures. So the problem of dealing with crazy states boils to necessity to destroy or subvert them, and, may be, as a last resort, to nuke them preemptively.
October 20th, 2006 at 8:10 pm
Given Bush’s psychological profile, he doesn’t seem to favor any of the three conclusions, Sergey had.
So I guess the initiative and the ball is in China’s and NK’s court. Not a good thing.
October 23rd, 2006 at 11:40 am
Sergey wrote: so-called “civil wars” is really list of failed states.
Huh? As per the US civil war? Actually very few on the list represent failed states
February 23rd, 2007 at 1:56 am
What did George Bush get on his SAT’s?
Barbecue Sauce
An Iraq war vet who briefly thought otherwise
May 21st, 2007 at 12:59 pm
royal carribean cruise…
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