First of all people around the world includes those “Armchair” guys they will know for the rest of their lives and for generation about how it (Iraq invasion) was waged. history never been forgetting such wars in name of freedom and democracy .

Secondly the matter of troop number, looks relevant when talking about war in Iraq to those who waged the war, why?

To answer this, its very simple answer, are those who planed for this war really believing in free Iraq?

Are they really went to Iraq with complete believe in their hearts and minds for helping Iraqis and freed Iraq from tyrant regime?

These questions and others which seeing answers on the ground there in Iraq day after day and months after months and years after years telling differently, its more about securing and holding advance feet on the ground in the region for long years to come.

May I pick your attention when Rumsfeld said “future generations of Americans will remember and thank” he knew that this war or the US presence in Iraq will be and should be for long term far from “Freedom and Democracy”, with his “Shock and Awe” war with it’s scale of power distracting a complete country and aftermath the distractions continue even the historical sites like Babylon during Bremer time when its reserves and US military camp.

So the Axis of Evil it was a case to build on for a war after more than four years we seeing Bush sending written letter to N. Korea, seeing US ambassador meeting Iranian reps in Baghdad, there were no Axis of Evils in fact there were one a gaol how to bite and sallow Iraq and hold it.

We should have let him engage in a nuclear arms race with iran.

We should have let the Iraqi people rot under crushing economic sanctions and cut off from the world by a travel embargo.

It was so arrogant of the US to think removing Saddam would be a good idea. Clearly the people of Iraq would be better off living under Saddam.

Vince P what “Rubbish” you put here, DONT PUT YOUR WORDS IN MY MOTH.

For update info for those who living in their Bubble, Iraqi now are not free to travel!!

Did you know this Vince P?

Only a certified merchant holding membership card, or for government missions. Other than that Iraqis are not allowed to leave the country.

Check your reference do your homework well before commenting here, these are newest orders.

There were several limiters of troop strength to deal with, some immutable, such as the isolation of Afghanistan, some unfortunate and political, such as not getting permission to send troops and convoys through Turkey. Combine that with a quite reasonable intent (despite Truth’s rambling) to make it absolutely clear that we were not and had no intention of being *occupiers* by going in light and it nearly seems a no-brainer, as they say.

In the end, though different tactics may have brought sooner results, we can’t know that significantly more boots on the ground in Iraq wouldn’t have done exactly what we hoped to avoid, put a lie on our claims not to want Iraq for ourselves and mobilized far more of the population against us and against the process of establishing a representative, diverse, Iraqi government. As it was we got accused (by Democrats if no one else) of erecting a “puppet” government, *anyway*.

What we’re going now we learned, mostly by trial and error, and there seems to be significant progress. Could we have done it without the trial and error? I don’t think we can answer confidently that we could have done.

First of all, naturally, I completely agree that there’s obviously no way to know for sure what would have happened given any alternative strategy. What we do know for sure is that most of the main architects of the war predicted far more stability than we saw, and even suppressed some serious attempts to plan for much of what actually transpired, which was understandable politically, but hardly prudent by any means.

However, I think your comments about Shinseki’s experience in Bosnia are not really accurate. First of all, Bosnia was in fact a successful operation — that is, once the international community got their asses in gear and deployed a stabilization force there. Also, to say that Shinseki didn’t have experience with counter-insurgency is also incorrect — the Bosnia operation was to a very large degree a counter-insurgency operation. As a number of analysts have pointed out, Shinseki’s troop estimates were a straightforward extrapolation from the experience of the international force in Bosnia. Contrary to your intimation that Shinseki may have simply been driven by a political desire to justify a large Army, in opposition to Rumsfeld, I think it’s he was just giving a relatively clinical, “by the book” estimate that wasn’t particularly politically motivated (had he been more political he probably would have toned down his estimate, I think.)

I should also note that Petraeus’ own COIN manual recommends very similar troop densities, thus a straightforward extrapolation from his COIN manual would lead to an overall estimate very similar to Shinseki’s.

I also don’t think the current downward trend in violence necessarily contradicts Shinseki’s estimate (or Petraeus’ own COIN manual recommendation). Instead, I think Petraeus simply did the most with what troops we had available — which, by the time of the “surge”, simply couldn’t have been much more than the 30,000 we managed to scrape up. So he intelligently allocated these troops, improved our tactics on the ground, and benefitted to some extent from a confluence of other factors, including the fact that Iraqis themselves turned against the Al Qaeda elements in their midst.

But — there is still a high level of violence in Iraq; the “surge” has reduced violence but hardly eliminated it. Shinseki’s estimate may have been conservative but it may also have been enough to have stabilized Iraq before it turned into what it is today. Naturally, Iraq is not Bosnia — it may have been harder to control than Bosnia even with a huge deployment of troops — but, it’s not clear that the current modest success we are seeing actually invalidates either Shinseki’s estimate or Petraeus’ COIN manual recommendations.

You need to read what neoneocon blog guidelines and way of commenting in this site.

Do you know this is some sort of defeats to what you hold with yourself?

Anyway there is no reason to speak to some like you who are “Deaf & Blind ” after four years of “Injustice” and “Manmade” war in Iraq.

As a Human who looks for bright side from respecting and communicating, I respect any view and I don’t in any way in support or beside any criminals, corrupted and tyrant regimes in ME.

World should defend human’s values by any human way but not wars.

The war worst answer for any case and it’s a tool of bulling and stupidity.

Michael Schwartz, Professor of Sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook

7 Facts Making Sense of Our Iraqi Disaster

Synova, Could we have done it without the trial and error? I don’t think we can answer confidently that we could have done.rambling more thatn other.

You make your argument on ” the trial and error” you talking here about human lifes, not Bees or chemicals!!

So who “rambling” here?

Did you bother to read what Michael Schwartz,? Michael Schwartz, Professor of Sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook

Where was the Acedmy before 9/11 to tell us what was coming? Oh, too busy spreading Leftist disinformation just like their Saudi masters paid for.

Regarding appropriate troops levels for counter-insurgency, don’t forget to count the Iraqi forces. Local concerned citizens groups, Iraqi police, and Iraqi Army all can be more effective than US forces in fighting terrorism within Iraq for obvious cultural reasons. The Long War Journal has been emphasizing this aspect for about a month, saying that the real surge in troops is Iraqi.

IMHO, it’s always easy to second guess strategy. At this point we don’t even have 20/20 hindsight.

Overall, I hold with the great former CEO Jack Welch. He declined to run for office, citing the variance between the objectives of the public sector and a CEO. He’s right. Headcutcounting should not be the primary objective of the Defense function. That is what concerns me about Romney as compared to the other mainstream GOP candidates.

Could you honestly tell us what you knew about Iraq before e and now? how much? What your involvements in Iraq case?

Oh, too busy spreading Leftist disinformation just like their Saudi masters paid for.

If is he, so for those neocon who support the war, isn’t?

Its easy to through words here and their, but for a moment just present you evidence about what your filamentary words about people like Professor Michael Schwartz, I think US universities be very concerned about her stuff and their acidic researches and level.

Now Donald Rumsfeld coming to Stanford Former secretary of defence to join Hoover as visiting fellow, so do we need to discredit Hoover Institution?

First wish your wife fast recovery and good health.

You don’t need “to give no comfort to the likes of Mitsu and Truther.” But Remember while your kids in your care far from their Mum, supporting war in Iraq for ever will cause those Dad, Mum most importantly the babies and kids a great and long lasting suffering because of this injustice war

Iraq insiderNovember 30, audio extra: Ghaith Abdul-Ahad disputes the current rosy American analysis of the situation in Baghdad
(Download the file and hear what’s life inside Iraq now)

Professor of sociology. Can’t get much more knowledgeable than that, unless it’s a professor of astrology, of course.

Actually, not all commenters on Iraq act or sound like “armchair generals” in the first place. Many people, for example, might be reluctant to get into debates about particular tactics or operations, on the understandable grounds that they lack the first-hand knowledge and expertise that gives any such criticism any credibility or worth — but are nonetheless quite prepared to argue the larger strategic, and often political, issues that underlie and motivate the tactics. Of those who do get involved in more detailed tactical issues, however, there’s a profound difference between those who at least recognize the limited and derivative nature of their position and those who — sometimes motivated by an opportunist or defeatist political position, but often enough driven by simple arrogance, vanity, or (putting it bluntly) stupidity — do not. There are a number of more specific signs of the latter (which, by the way, are also traits commonly associated with the more obnoxious of adolescent gamers):
- a tendency to refer to all actual policy makers as across-the-board incompetent and thick to a literally unbelievable degree;
- a tendency to indulge in speculation that’s always favorable to one’s own tactical advise, as though historical “what-ifs” were simple facts (at least until called on it);
- an tendency to engage in unashamed 20-20 hindsight, as though that were the same as foresight;
- and a tendency to brag that one has made correct predictions or prophecies in the past, typically in ignorance of the stopped-clock principle.

In general, avoiding such tendencies will be of much greater help in being taken seriously in these debates, than merely posting voluminously or frequently.

To have done a total control thing from the start would have required massive boots on the ground to make it work.

What has happened here is the following combo in almost sync.

Anbar Awakening ..locals said they had enough and wouldn’t take it any more and came over to our side

Combined with our surge plus local army numbers plus local police numbers plus local volunteer numbers were finally up to a total manning that would allow clear and hold rather than playing wack a mole which didn’t do a whole lot for continued local stability.

Local intel to target the bad guys as stability started to break out all over.

Local troops and police to much easier than us to recognize who didn’t fit in an area that needed to be checked out.

Now even with our numbers winding down, we are training locals faster and manning up forces faster than AQ has been taking them out and even retraining those who just got the basics before being thrown into the fight.

Battle hardened local troops are much more effective down the line just from the experience.

Casualty losses to locals falling off rapidly as AQ is off their game plus new additions of troops is raising the total number faster than we are withdrawing our own.

By the time we get back to pre surge levels the combined forces may out number what they were when we peaked our surge.

Holding an area takes a lot less effort than clearing it so some will be moved to clear and hold in areas they haven’t done before and others will be formed up into rapid reaction groups to put where needed on short notice.

All in all the ratios are all going to working against the bad guys of all types.

Possible and realistic is trial and error. Perfection exists for God alone, not humans. Demanding perfection because this is people and not bees or chemicals is ignorant.

However, the growth in the Iraqi security forces has been significant. I happen to think Shinseki was correct in his assessment, not just due to the current success of the surge, but to a story of special forces troops who reached a town in western Anbar, set up a local government, then had to withdraw, leaving the local government vulnerable to the influx of armed insurgents. So I think Rumsfeld was probably wrong in his dedication to a thin American presence. Live and learn, eh. Another topic for speculation is what would have happened if Garner had been left in charge. At the time, I had the impression that Garner was interested in the sort grass roots political developments that are taking place now.

What can more “ignorant” than you and alike.

Do you suppose, just maybe, you could be misunderstanding the finer points of what people have said because your English isn’t perfect?

I have great admiration for anyone who knows more than one language but it does make a difference if you’re not using your first one.

But let’s bring another example of professional who promoted to Iraq his professionalism vastly reported as “Ambassador Bremer is one of the world’s leading experts on crisis management, terrorism and homeland security. Ambassador Bremer is one of the world’s leading experts on crisis management, terrorism and homeland security. .

This folk ended fleeing Iraq with chaos instead crisis management, he flee with $US9.5 Billions of Iraqi money vanished without trace he claims that the contractors put FAKE names and falsely reporting the number of employees they hired that why the many lost, there were no baking system in Iraq!! So he got delivered billions in cash, and finally his climes that he asked for more troops on the ground no one listen to him.

Does this guy deserve all the above professions as stated in the bio above?

Iraq approved he is not up to the job, who create chaos in Iraq he is the man responsible for all sec. divisions inside Iraq starting with his CPA appointees, his false crisis management, Wonder if in one year in Iraq $US9.5 Billions vanished if he stayed for 24 year like Saddam how much money will be vanished from Iraqi money?

In old days, one destroyed enemies, crushed them, until, thoroughly humiliated, they sincerely sued for peace, being utterly convinced that further opposition would result in their utter destruction. We are too enlightened for that these days. But a price comes with our humanity; they get off easy, and we look like paper tigers, so bring on the insurgencies!

I believe that in time, historians and observers will conclude that the Iraqis and their foreign brothers in religion did the remarkable work of proving to all Iraqis that their very survival and any hope of a dignified existence depended on their stepping up to the plate and joining the Americans in stabilizing their country. Iraqis becoming competent in the profession of arms while fighting, side by side with the Americans against the jihadis and the dead-enders, could not have taken place if we had no need of Iraqi assistance in such an effort, and wouldn’t have taken place if the Iraqis hadn’t had it proven to them that the foreign fighters and their own sects and various hatreds were destroying them.

No sane account of what Americans inflicted on Iraq can compare to the depraved atrocities visited upon the Iraqi people by their own selves and their fellow religionists.

I certainly won’t give GWB credit for planning such a thing in advance, and I doubt we’ll ever have the foresight or competence to engineer such a cultural wake-up-call, but I believe we lucked out in this circumstance. We aren’t out of the woods yet, but the Iraqis now know it’s themselves that have to do it.

I would suggest, as an add to other considerations, that logistics constraints were a rather huge limiter on realistic initial troop numbers.

You can’t put any larger force into the field than what you can feed, water and supply. The primary (and nearly only possible available) supply rout was bumper to bumper from end to end as it was.

I would also suggest that the timing of the surge was as much dictated by time required to preposition and build up the logistical depth required to put more warfighters into the field.

The tooth to tail ratio used to be 10 to 1. For every combat soldier in the fight, 10 supply and logistics personnel needed to be on line behind him. I believe it is now down to 7 to 1 but not terribly sure.

Another misconception is that this is “Gen Petraeus’ COIN”. General Petraeus is a proven intelligent soldier and well versed in counter insurgency, but, regardless what the heathen like to blather, the US has a good handle on such operations and has had for a century or so. The concepts go up for revision and adjustments to current technical capacity, but the foundations of this COIN aren’t all that much different from previous Operations Manuals on the subject.

It is the US Military’s COIN. It doesn’t belong, nor was it written specifically by Gen. Petraeus. He was in on the process though.

Col (Dr?) Kilcullen also had responsibility for what was produced.

Counter Insurgency is always, without exception, messy, ugly and difficult. The rule of thumb is to not expect resolution for at least 10 years. We are way ahead of the curve in Iraq.

Counter Insurgency campaigns are also the easiest for enemy propagandists to skew and misconstrue to turn a civilian pop against its own warfighters.

Fighting ‘the war’ (re: against the Iraqi armed forces) Rumsfeld’s way worked. But, more troops to secure arms sites and the boarder… wouldn’t have hurt…
.

for the first time, has instituted a competent, if ad hoc occupation, by doing pragmatic deals in local areas and regions, constructing massive walls in Baghdad to keep warring sects apart, effectively bribing other areas with new investments and providing sufficient troops in some places to maintain a lull in the massive bloodletting that the US invasion unleashed.

Bhutto was a great woman, and this is a tragedy for the world. However, I think your comments about George Galloway and Michael Moore are a bit bizarre. Whatever you make think of his politics, George Galloway was a longtime friend of Benazir Bhutto, and it’s a bit inappropriate, I think, at a time like this, to make comments such as the above.

That’s because you think Shinseki is a better general than Petraeus. Yet all you are doing is making yourself and Shinseki, who you ideologically agree with, into nothing but armchair generals. Which isn’t nearly as good as the real deal going on right now in Iraq.

The reason I put the armchair in ()s is to make two points. One, your claims of saying that Shinseki, and additionally you, Mitsu, could have done what Petraeus has done now, except better and without having to spend years working with a military family and team to produce a solid counter-insurgency strategy for Iraq, is a categorical acclamation that Shinseki, and hence indirectly you, are better generals than Petraeus. Yet your intent to forward Shinseki for a position that is your central idea here, is simply replacing a real general that leads from the front and in the conflict zone, with armchair generals.

Regardless of what Shinseki himself thinks, said, or did, having one of his supporters, you, put him forward into a leadership position with the fallacious assertion and delusion that Shinseki could have gotten everything done better, faster, and neater than General Petraeus, is making Shinseki into a better armchair general than Petraeus. Which I admit is true.

Your reasons for doing so are transparent. Your are invested in the idea that you know how to conduct counter-insurgency better than those who lived, fought, and died in Iraq to produce the newest COIN manual and implementation of it in Iraq for America. Aside from the amount of conceit such involves, it is not a good enough reason to monday quarterback, Mitsu, by putting generals that you like into combat roles.

You may speak all you wish about how you recognize that people can’t be sure what will happen. What is important is that you are sure, sure enough to do what you said you would have done had you the power. Which was to put Shinseki in charge, if at all possible. This is the “situation” that you are willing to pre-empt, because you have the luxury of sitting in a timeline where it didn’t happen.

None of your proposals has anything to do with improving the present or the future and everything to do with validating your own personal ideology and philosophy.

As one short example, you seem to think that when you put Shinseki forward as a better armchair general then Petraeus, that it is now suddenly me that is calling Shinseki out for being an armchair general concerning second guessing the decisions of other combat leaders in Iraq. When it was you who did that.

once the international community got their asses in gear

I did mention your ideological investment, did I not?

Just checking.

Contrary to your intimation that Shinseki may have simply been driven by a political desire to justify a large Army, in opposition to Rumsfeld, I think it’s he was just-Mitsu

Just trying to fight the Cold War over again, when Democrats and Republicans had already grabbed the Peace Dividend through slashing the US military. There is such a thing as logistics in military conflicts. Usually the larger the army you have to field, the greater your logistical need and the lower the amount of time you can field that army before things start breaking down.

Which is the political reason why you wanted a larger army for Iraq, given the fact that the sheer logistical constraints would force US withdrawal after a few years regardless of what the strategy said was best in Iraq.

What you prefer politically, Mitsu, is not the same as what Shinsek prefered. You act as if this is about Shinseki, when it is about what you want Shinseki to be.

I should also note that Petraeus’ own COIN manual recommends very similar troop densities, thus a straightforward extrapolation from his COIN manual would lead to an overall estimate very similar to Shinseki’s.

To sum it up, you’re using Petraeus’ work and the work of his leaders and soldiers, in order to draw glory to yourself and Shinseki for being the ones that would have prevented the insurgency from growing after the Iraq invasion, without the need for Petraeus or his work, had your policies been implemented in 2003. Is that about it?

In the end, your purpose is closely related to getting the US out of Iraq because it was a mistake. Thus the best way to do that is to fix the problem of Iraq and the insurgency before it even starts, in order to pre-empt the problems that keep America in Iraq. This has nothing to do with solving problems as they exist, Mitsu, and everything to do with wishes and fantasy.

You’re not focused on making things better, Mitsu. You’re focused on correcting what you see as ideological mistakes. Thus your foundation is weak and from that, all else follows.

Leadership always fights the last war. In the case of Iraq, the last war was Afghanistan, the graveyard of Empires. We toppled the Taliban with a light footprint campaign by allying with local forces, and it was a brilliant campaign. With that success flush in everybody’s mind, arguing that Iraq needed a heavy footprint would be difficult.

-MartyH

OIF was fighting the last war, which was Gulf War 1. No indigenous forces or SF centered alliance with locals was part of OIF. I agree with the general principle, but not your application of it.

America had no experience with invading a country, defeating the armed forces of that country, and still having to fight another unconventional war in the same country. In this aspect alone, America could gain no benefit from the experience of Japan and Germany. Even the Phillipines was conducted via guerrilla warfare in the days where a General, Pershing, could be made military governor. The change in communications technology has almost totally invalidated Pershing’s experience with the Moors, assuming people even picked up anything of it to use in Iraq.

So it didn’t matter whether people wanted a heavy footprint or not. Nobody knew what problems would occur and how to solve them, because everybody involved was a human. Not even American historical experiences could give advice, and certainly not Vietnam which was the graveyard of defeats.

[I obviously wrote this before reading Synova’s comments. The similarity you see here is due to simple agreement on fundamental philosophical premises.]

I’m sure Rumsfelds response to requests for more troops ran along the lines of, “We didn’t need 1/10th of the troops your are requesting for Afghanistan.” So, to some extent, we learned the wrong lesson from Afghanistan.

Rumsfeld went with the strategies and recommendations of his commanders as far as I saw. Which in the case of Iraq, was Cold War era heavy armored column commanders, and in Afghanistan was CIA section chiefs and Special Forces operators. Entirely different focus and competence level between regular Army and SF in 2003. It would account for why Afghanistan had a leader, Karzai, ready to go while Iraq was… in trasition and had Bremer. It would also account for many other things, such as no attempt to use local forces in fighting Saddam in Kurdish/Shia areas. There might have been an argument for why it was too much trouble to get local support in Sunni Tikrit areas against Saddam, but the Army could not use that excuse for pro-American Kurds and the Shiites that have been fighting and dying against Saddam’s forces for decades.

I would suggest, as an add to other considerations, that logistics constraints were a rather huge limiter on realistic initial troop numbers.-Grimmy

Yeah, logistics. That thing that nobody talks about because tactics and strategy are easier, more immediate, or just more common. However, without good logistics, tactics and strategy are worthless. Which is sort of why there is a saying that goes around about amateurs studying tactics and professionals studying logistics. It can be used as a slight or insult, but to those in the know, it is simply the way it is. You start with the basics and then you work your way up to more advanced levels. You don’t do it the other way around, no matter how brilliant you are.

There was only so many divisions you could place in Kuwaitt before the locals start thinking you aren’t ever going to leave.

I believe it is now down to 7 to 1 but not terribly sure.

I heard a figure quoted in 2005-6 that with KBR contractors, the ratio is 3 to 1 now. It’s hard to tell without an exact break down of unit designations and adjunct stuff. Also, Green Zone ratios are obviously going to be higher than Al Anbar or Mosul ratios. The three to 1 ratio may only apply to non HQ areas.

Link

You are free to have your opinions of Galloway’s politics, but to suggest that he’s cheering when one of his personal friends gets gunned down is absurd. It’s a perfect example of the way political discourse gets dumbed down into near meaninglessness. Suppose a lifelong friend of yours was gunned down, and people started to talk about how you must be “cheering” it because they disagreed with you politically? That’s exactly what this sort of comment is. So no, I’m going to vehemently disagree that this sort of remark is at all appropriate at any time, least of all this.

Ymarsakar, you are saying I am saying tons of stuff I neither said nor believe, so all I have to say is: I neither said nor do I believe any of what you attribute to me. I stand by what I wrote, which is that Shinseki’s estimate of troop strength was a by the book, conventional assessment, which agrees with Petraeus’ own COIN manual. I have said nothing about Shinseki being a “better general than Petraeus”, nor about me being able to conduct counter-insurgency operations myself, which obviously I couldn’t. I’m discussing my opinion, based on my own reading and research. An example of others who give this view:

http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/09/14/edmark_ed3_.php

as Mark Brzezinski (former director with the National Security Council) and Eric Rosenbach (former military intelligence officer in the Balkans) put it:

“Major General James Darden, the officer responsible for drawing down the U.S. mission in Bosnia, recently said, “If we could do it over again, I don’t know how we could do it better. It could be considered a model or a template for future international peacekeeping missions.” … When 60,000 troops initially crossed the Sava River, the security environment in Bosnia quickly and dramatically improved. In contrast to the anarchy experienced by Iraqis, Bosnians saw soldiers on nearly every corner. For the first time in more than five years, their neighborhoods were safe. Equally important, the size of the force protected American soldiers, too.”

That evasion can’t even work given that I can just grab what you said from Neo’s post.

…had we gone into Iraq with more troops in the first place, as Shinseki had recommended, the situation in Iraq wouldn’t have deteriorated nearly as much as it has.

Why are you acting as if your memory is weak? It isn’t.

You didn’t say probably. You didn’t say possibly. You didn’t say hopefully. You said would not have deteriorated. Now you act as if you weren’t playing the armchair general? And expect that to pass?

I have said nothing about Shinseki being a “better general than Petraeus”

Do you really think I care more about what you say in relation to what you believe, the logic you have used, and the logical inconsistencies of your arguments? Get some perspective here. What you “say” is only an indirect reference to what you believe, which is the real issue, as you well know.

I do not think you expect me to believe that Shinseki could do all that you claim he could have done, had Shinseki not been a better general than Petraeus. Petraeus needed years of fighting, learning, and sacrifice by his men and women before he could change the tide. You say Shinseki could have grabbed Bosnian stuff and made it work in Iraq off the bat.

Maybe you are just operating on cognitive dissonance here, Mitsu. If so, I make no claims that I can decipher your claims, counter-claims, and counter-counter-claims.

You stand by your claims that Shinseki could have done a better job of generalship than Petraeus in Iraq, by using Petraeus’ own manuals as supporting material. So, go ahead if you think you have no need to defend such a… construct.

nor about me being able to conduct counter-insurgency operations myself, which obviously I couldn’t.

Sure you can, Mitsu. After all, you believe counter-insurgency was conducted in Bosnia and successfully so. How do you think you can believe that without knowing how to conduct counter-insurgency operations if you had to do it? Okay, assume you don’t know, which is where Shinseki comes in, correct. But Shinseki’s retired, so why are you using Petraeus, who is right now fighting for America in fight, as a way to bolster some kind of alternate history statement about Shinseki?

This may all make sense to you, Mitsu, but that is because you think your beliefs are consistent with all your other beliefs. I think not therefore I raise up the challenge.

I’m discussing my opinion, based on my own reading and research. An example of others who give this view:

That’s sort of like saying “I’m discussing my opinion of my birth”. What do you think you are accomplishing, really? Except justifying your own existence and defending them against challenges? If you are trying to convince yourself that you are right and other folks, like Rumsfeld, are wrong, I don’t see the point to your ‘opinion’ about Shinseki and Bosnia. Unless I bring in what you already said about your beliefs concerning how Iraq is a mistake.

But then, that just backs up my argument that you are talking about ideological problems you have, instead of problems with insurgents that Iraqis and Americans have.

Armchair generals lead from the back, solving problems in their head that have little to nothing to do with the problems at the front. So I will ask the question again, and perhaps you will be able to understand it better now, why do you think you or shinseki would be better armchair generals than Petraeus?

The answers might surprise you.

Iraq, and you say, he was a friend to Bhutto?

That simply brings into question whether Benazir Bhutto really was the hope for liberty that some people thought she was. If, given that she was long term friends with such folks as Galloway.

You can get out of the logic trap of my question through saying what you obviously believe, which is that neither you, Shinseki, or Petraeus are or are trying to be armchair generals.

While that is inconsistent with your attempts to armchair Shinseki, Bosnia, and various other things into Iraq 2003 according to your position from the arm of the chair, it is still probably the best method of dodging the logic trap. You are trapped by your own logic, Mitsu, even if mine does not work.

…something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We’re talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that’s fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground-force presence.

For a rather blunt appraisal of Shinseki, in opposition to your views, Mitsu, take a look here.

Link

The link provides any arguments you might wish about why your opinions are wrong, if you need something like that from me.

Link

That and the other link I provided paints a good picture of what both sides thought of each other. Meaning, without the ability to understand and predict human nature, without the ability to pierce the wall of illusion present in all propaganda and psychological warfare incidents, such articles are meaningless. But with such tools, you can get much from the Guardian and the nationalreview article.

You’re free to have your opinions of Galloway’s politics as well (and it’s pretty clear now what they are), but to say I said anything about “cheering” is both false and beside the point. It doesn’t matter what Galloway is doing now (unless he’s suddenly stricken with a conscience and is in groveling apology for his many, many past misdeeds, which I doubt) — what matters is what he stands for and who he stands with. And, however ironic and ugly that may be, that’s with the kind of people who perpetrated this murder.

May be nice to read more and be connected withhuman forces in the world

In the case of Iraq, neoconservatives preferred war. Their search for a quick and painless democratic transformation, which they did not find, was a naive one. But their other belief was not so naive: this is the belief that over the long run, the realist strategy of accommodation and containment of execrable regimes – the pursuit of stability at all moral costs practised by the West for thirty It’s precisely at “a time like this” that it’s vital to be clear about the lines connecting the anti-West, anti-capitalist, anti-freedom, and fundamentally anti-human forces in the world

May be nice to read more and be connected to human forces in the world

In the case of Iraq, neoconservatives preferred war. Their search for a quick and painless democratic transformation, which they did not find, was a naive one. But their other belief was not so naive: this is the belief that over the long run, the realist strategy of accommodation and containment of execrable regimes – the pursuit of stability at all moral costs practised by the West for thirty years – would only serve to feed the beast.

Doomed international
Kenneth Anderson
years – would only serve to feed the beast.

Doomed international
Kenneth Anderson

Like I said, what you’re attributing to me isn’t what I believe. I certainly don’t have enough evidence to know whether Shinseki or Petraeus are better or worse than each other — my *opinion* is that Petraeus is in fact the more astute general, perhaps one of the best we’ve ever seen. In fact, I alluded to this, earlier, with my speculation that more troops may have been needed because at the time we didn’t have someone as good as Petraeus in command.

As for whether or not *I* am a general — I’m not a general. However, I have opinions about the overall strategy and tactics of the war, yes, and my opinion is that it’s been handled very badly, until Petraeus and Gates came on the scene. I’ve given my reasons why.

>and it’s pretty clear now what they are

Sally, I’ve been trying to argue for quite a while now here on this board one simple point, which I know you and many others here disagree with: which is that all of us, from nearly every point on the political spectrum, are closer to each other than we are to our enemies. We’re on the same side. None of us want the downfall of Western civilization, much as we may secretly suspect the others are working towards it.

I’ve stated time and again that I disagree with leftists on many points, and I’ll say it again: I disagree with them. But: I know they are idealistic people who want the world to be a better place, just as all of you right-wingers do. You disagree on HOW to get there, but none of you want the collapse of Western civilization.

I think it makes us weaker when we lump together political opponents with people who are determined to destroy us, as though our opponents would actually be happy if our enemies defeated us. You may think their actions are helping our enemies — but to think they actually want our enemies to prevail I believe is completely false.

Since you said you were a leftist once, I would at least hope you’d understand that.

I am not a leftist, but I think leftists have good intentions: I am not a rightist, but I am sure you have good intentions as well. I think both you and the leftists are wrong much of the time. (I do think it’s interesting that many rightists were former leftists — I think there’s a strange similarity between the two types of thinking.)

I was once a leftist, Mitsu, but that was when the left was a different place. (Then, I think you’re right that there was at least a “similarity between the two types of thinking”, but that’s a topic for another time.) Since then, that left has gone through a number of traumatic cultural and historical upheavals that, for some time, left it essentially unmoored and drifting. And many people, myself included, found themselves drifting away from it. Some people continued to try to uphold its outmoded banner, but in a principled manner which I do respect; some young people continue to be seduced by its now faded claims to their idealism, and I do understand that. But a significant number lost themselves in the process, and became mired in a welter of confusion, bitter and frustrated, antagonistic to anything positive, hostile to anything Western (America being but the symbol of all they hated), filled with shame and guilt over anything they were or had inherited. And that, sadly, constitutes a very significant portion of what’s left of the left, in its contemporary, “activist” sects at least. It’s not a pretty picture, but you can’t just paper it over with a claim of “good intentions” — the unpleasant reality is that, whether explicitly or not, such leftists share too much of the virulent anti-Western hatred that fuels the islamist fascists, and only lack the religious fanaticism. I take your point about the error of lumping simple political opponents in with those who seek our demise as a culture and civilization. But that error cuts both ways — it’s also a serious and potentially fatal mistake to fail to recognize when those who seek our demise try to disguise themselves as merely political opponents.